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Evidence-NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE-LEGISLATIVELY NACTED 
NEWSMAN'S PRIVILEGE INVALID AS INFRINGEMENT O  JUDICIAL RULE- 
MAKING POWER-Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 551 
P.2d 1354 (N.M. 1976). 
The plaintiffs in this case sought recovery from the defen- 
dants for allegedly slanderous radio broadcasts. The district court 
ordered the defendants to disclose the names of all their claimed 
confidential informants and to produce, or make available to 
plaintiffs, all information defendants claimed to have received 
from those informants. The defendants appealed the order pur- 
suant to a provision of the New Mexico newsman's privilege stat- 
ute.' The plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss the appeal upon the 
grounds that the statutory provision under which the appeal was 
taken was unconstitutional. At the request of the district court, 
the question of the constitutionality of the appellate procedure 
and the broader question of the constitutionality of the news- 
man's privilege itself were briefed for review.' The supreme court 
dismissed the appeal, holding that the privilege in general was 
invalid in judicial proceedings and that the statute's appeal pro- 
vision was largely i n ~ a l i d . ~  
A. General Overview 
Although hotly debated a few decades the question of 
1. N.M. STAT. ANN. 8 20-1-12.1(C) (Supp. 1975): 
If the proceeding in which disclosure is sought is in the district court, that 
court will determine whether disclosure is essential to prevent injustice. . . . 
Disclosure shall, in no event, be ordered except upon written order of the district 
court stating the reasons why disclosure is essential to prevent injustice. Such 
an order is appealable to the Supreme Court if the appeal is docketed in that 
court within ten [lo] days after its entry. . . . and shall be heard de novo . . . . 
2. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 551 P.2d 1354, 1356 (N.M. 1976). 
3. Id. This case note will only deal with the issue of the constitutionality of the 
privilege itself, and not with the issue of the validity of the appeal procedure. 
4. Stein, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-making Power Prescribe Rules 
of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 639, 645 (1940); see Gertner, The Inherent Power of Courts to 
Make Rules, 10 U. CIN. L. REV. 32, 58 (1936); Hibschman, The Power to Regulate Court 
Procedure-Is It a Legislative or a Judicial Function?, 71 UNITED STATES L. REV. 618 
(1937); Pound, The Rule-making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926); Sunderland, 
Character and Extent of the Rule-making Power Granted U.S. Supreme Court and Meth- 
ods of Effective Exercise, 21 A.B.A.J. 404 (1935); Tyler, The Origin of the Rule-making 
Power and Its Exercise by Legislatures, 22 A.B.A.J. 772 (1936); Wigmore, All Legislative 
Rules for Judiciary Procedure Are Void Constitutionally, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928). Two 
exhaustive lists of sources may be found in Curd, Substance and Procedure in Rule 
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whether the judiciary has or should be given power to make rules 
of procedure has long been resolved, generally in the courts' 
favor? The methods or doctrines, however, used to support or 
implement this result have varied from state to state. Generally, 
courts have claimed rulemaking authority upon one of three 
bases: (1) an historically existing, inherent judicial power to pro- 
mulgate procedural rules;6 (2) an enabling act passed by the legis- 
lature authorizing the courts to make rules of procedure;' or (3) 
a constitutional provision specifically delegating to the supreme 
court the right to create procedural rules for judicial proceedings? 
1. Rulemaking as an inherent power of the courts 
Dean Roscoe Pound, an early twentieth century champion of 
the theory that courts have inherent rulemaking power, outlined 
three rationales in support of the theory? First, Pound main- 
tained that at the time the American Constitution was adopted, 
the King's Court in England had power to make general rules of 
procedure, and American courts inherited this power, although it 
remained dormant for many years. During this period of dor- 
mancy, the rulemaking power was exercised by legislatures as 
they enacted codes and practice acts. This period of judicial apa- 
thy, however, did not negate the courts' inherent power.1° Second, 
Pound reasoned that in making its own procedural rules a court 
can formulate and discard rules as it deems necessary. Because 
of the particularized way it reacts to each case, a court is better 
suited than a legislature to deal with procedural matters. Courts 
need this inherent flexibility in order to effectively perform their 
duties? Third, Dean Pound observed that the rules governing the 
operation of a governmental branch ought to be made by that 
branch. The judiciary knows best what rules are necessary and 
appropriate for the judicial process and thus is best suited to 
formulate those rules. l2 
Making, 51 W. VA. L.Q. 34, 54-55 app. (1948), and The Rule-making Power: A 
Bibliography, 16 A.B.A.J. 199, 199-202 (1930). 
5. Stein, supra note 4, at 645. 
6. See People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934); Little v. State, 90 Ind. 338, 
339 (1883). 
7. See State ex rel. Wilson v. County Court, 145 W. Va. 435, 114 S.E.2d 904, 909 
(1960); Fleming v. Dent, 120 W. Va. 691, 693-94, 200 S.E. 35, 36 (1938). 
8. See Buscaino v. Rhodes, 385 Mich. 474,478-79, 189 N.W.2d 202, 204 (1971); Tom- 
linson v. Tomlinson, 338 Mich. 274, 276, 61 N.W.2d 102, 103 (1953). 
9. Pound, supra note 4. 
10. Id. at 601-02; see Curd, supra note 4, at 38-39. 
11. Pound, supra note 4, at 602-03. 
12. Id. 
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2. Rulemaking as a statutory power 
Legislative acts, delegating to the jurisdiction's highest court 
the power to regulate procedure in its own and all lower court 
proceedings, are a second basis for judicial rulemaking authority. 
Such an enabling act may indicate that the authority is to be 
exercised exclusively by the court13 or concurrently with the legis- 
lature." It may also prescribe the status of former statutory rules 
of procedure. l5 
3. Rulemaking as a constitutional power 
An express mandate in the form of a state constitutional 
provision is another ground upon which some courts have been 
able to claim rulemaking power? When rulemaking authority is 
based on a constitutional provision, arguments against vesting 
the authority in the judiciary, such as judicial usurpation of a 
legislative function and the unconstitutional delegation of legisla- 
tive authority, lose their cogency.17 Occasionally, when an express 
constitutional mandate for rulemaking is absent, courts have bol- 
stered assertions of implied constitutional power with arguments 
of inherent power. la 
The supreme court of appeals may, from time to time make and promulgate 
general rules and regulations governing pleading, practice and procedure in such 
court and in all other courts of record of this State. All statutes relating to 
pleading, practice and procedure shall have force and effect only as rules of court 
and shall remain in effect unless and until modified, suspended or annulled by 
rules promulgated pursuant to the provisions of this section. . . . 
. . . .  
. . . When and as the rules of the court herein authorized shall be prescribed, 
adopted, and promulgated, all laws and parts of laws that conflict therewith 
shall be and become of no further force or effect, to the extent of such conflict. 
14. For a discussion of those jurisdictions that had statutory or constitutional limita- 
tions on judicial rulemaking, see Paul, The Rule-making Power of the Courts, 1 WASH. L. 
REV. 163, 176-80 (1926). Since 1926, however, most of these jurisdictions have removed or 
lessened those restrictions. 
15. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. 4 21-3-2 (1953). 
16. E.g., MICH. CONST. art. VI, 4 5: "The supreme court shall by general rules estab- 
lish, modify, amend and simplify the practice and procedure in all courts of this state." 
See note 8 supra. 
17. See Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural?, 10 VAND. L. REV. 
467, 483 (1957); Peterson, Rule Making in Colorado: An Unheralded Crisis in Procedural 
Reform, 38 U .  COLO. L. REV. 137, 149-64 (1966). 
18. E.g.., State ex rel. Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 246, 539 P.2d 1006, 1008 
(1975). 
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B. Rulemaking in New Mexico 
In 1933 the New Mexico legislature passed an enabling act 
declaring that New Mexico's Surpeme Court had the power to 
regulate the rules of pleading, practice, and procedure in judicial 
proceedings of all the courts of New Mexico.19 Section 2 of this 
act specified that previous statutory procedural rules and subse- 
quent legislative acts would become rules of the court unless sus- 
pended or modified by the court. 
In State v. Roy,20 the supreme court first interpreted the 
enabling act. The court stated that the act was not a grant of 
power to the court, but rather a legislative declaration of abdica- 
tion from the field of procedural ~ l e m a k i n g . ~ ~  Following Roy, the 
court reaffirmed its position that it had inherent and implied 
constitutional power to promulgate procedural rules. 22 Finally, in 
Anaya v. M ~ B r i d e , ~ ~  the court held that the power to prescribe 
procedural rules was vested exclusively in the judiciary and that 
any statutory attempt to enact such rules would not be binding.z4 
The court pointed to its constitutional, supervisory authority over 
inferior courtsz5 and reasoned that the grant carried with it the 
inherent power to make procedural rules? Thus, in light of the 
19. 1933 N.M. Laws ch. 84, § § 1-2 (codified a t  N.M. STAT. ANN. § § 21-3-1, -2 (1953)): 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico shall, by rules promulgated by it from 
time to time, regulate pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings 
in all courts of New Mexico for the purpose of simplifying and promoting the 
speedy determination of litigation upon its merits. Such rules shall not abridge, 
enlarge or modify the substantive rights of any litigant. 
. . . .  
All statutes relating to pleading, practice and procedure, now existing, 
shall, from and after the passage of this act, have force and effect only as rules 
of court and shall remain in effect unless and until modified or suspended by 
rules promulgated pursuant hereto. 
20. 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936). 
21. Id. at 419, 60 P.2d at 660. The court concluded that "[wlhen the legislature 
enacted chapter 84, it merely withdrew from a field wherein it had functioned as a co- 
ordinate branch of our government with the court in the promulgation of rules of pleading, 
practice, and procedure." Id. Finding that the New Mexico Constitution's grant of super- 
visory authority over lower courts meant that it must have rulemaking power, the court 
asserted that it had both constitutional and inherent power to promulgate procedural 
rules. Id. at 421-22, 60 P.2d at 661-62. 
22. State v. Gunzelman, 85 N.M. 295, 512 P.2d 55 (1973); Alexander v. Delgado, 84 
N.M. 717, 507 P.2d 778 (1973); Sitta v. Zinn, 77 N.M. 146, 420 P.2d 131 (1966); State v. 
Arnold, 51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845 (1947); City of Roswell v. Holmes, 44 N.M. 1, 96 P.2d 
701 (1939). 
23. 88 N.M. 244, 539 P.2d 1006 (1975). 
24. Id. at 246, 539 P.2d at 1008. 
25. N.M. CONST. art. 6, 8 3: "The Supreme Court . . . shall have a superintending 
control over all inferior courts . . . ." 
26. 88 N.M. at 246, 539 P.2d at 1008. 
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1933 enabling act, Roy, its progeny, and McBride, it seems clear 
that the New Mexico Supreme Court has rulemaking power and 
that this power may be excl~sive.~' 
C .  Rulemaking and the Substanee-Procedure Dichotomy 
Even though it may have exclusive power to make procedural 
rules, a state supreme court has no rulemaking authority with 
respect to substantive matters. It is therefore critical to a discus- 
sion of rulemaking power to distinguish between procedural and 
substantive matters. Although the line between substance and 
procedure is difficult to draw,28 the distinction has been made in 
some 
The distinction is important in differentiating between legis- 
lative and judicial responsibilitie~.~~ In this context, the legisla- 
ture is viewed as being empowered to create the substantive 
rights of individuals and the judiciary is considered as having the 
power to enforce those rights by means of rules promulgated to 
that end. Thus, the legislature is to enact laws "which have for 
their purpose to determine the rights and duties of the individual 
and to regulate his conduct and relation with the government and 
other individuals," and the judiciary is to formulate rules "which 
have for their purpose merely to prescribe machinery and meth- 
ods to be employed in enforcing these positive  provision^."^^ 
The substance-procedure dichotomy and the resulting divi- 
sion between legislative and judicial responsibilities and powers 
is particularly confusing in the area of the law of evidence. Al- 
though rules governing the admission or exclusion of evidence 
seem to be procedural in nature, certain evidentiary rules are 
substantive declarations of policy because of their inextricable 
involvement with legal rights and duties. Such rules are probably 
beyond a court's rulemaking power.32 
27. See Curd, supra note 4, at 36. 
28. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945); Green, To What Extent 
May Courts Under the Rule-making Power Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 482 
(1940). 
29. The distinction between substance and procedure has perhaps been most impor- 
tant in the area of choice of laws. The determination whether a given rule is substantive 
or procedural is vital to a decision whether to apply federal or state law in a federal 
diversity action. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
30. See Green, supm note 28, at 483-86; Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and 
Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REV. 623, 653 (1957). 
31. Riedl, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-making Power Prescribe 
Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A.J. 601, 605 n.31 (1940). 
32. 3 J. HONIGMAN & C. HAWKINS, MICH. CT. RULES ANN. 403 (2d ed. 1965). Honigman 
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Of various evidentiary rules," privileges appear to be more 
substantive than procedural. Because they represent both consid- 
erations of public policy that are extrinsic to judicial concerns of 
evidence preservation and policy determinations that the foster- 
ing of certain relationships is preferable to the orderly dispatch- 
ing of l i t i ga t i~n ,~~  privileges are substantive declarations of cer- 
tain individual's rights, vesting in these persons rights not other- 
wise possessed. As has been noted: 
While framed as rules of evidence, [privileges] are not based 
upon policies concerned with the reliability or relevance of proof 
or the orderly dispatch of judicial business. Rather thay are 
concerned with the interests to be served by encouraging uninhi- 
bited action within the particular situation or relationship. The 
advancement of the privileged interest is declared more impor- 
tant that the availability of one item of proof in the course of 
l i t i ga t i~n .~~  
In the instant case, the New Mexico Supreme Court reasoned 
that the statute enacting the newsman's privilege "did nothing 
more nor less than attempt to create a rule of evidence, compara- 
ble to other  privilege^."^^ Citing Professor Edmund Morgan's ra- 
tionale for categorizing privileges as evidentiary rules within the 
court's rulemaking power,37 the court asserted that there was "no 
and Hawkins refer specifically to the parol evidence rule and the Statute of Frauds as 
examples of rules that appear to be procedural and evidentiary while actually being 
substantive in nature. For example, the parol evidence rule operates as a substantive rule 
of contract law marking the bounds of what constitutes a contract between parties and 
defining their duties and rights. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS # 239, Com- 
ment a (1973); Green, supra note 28, at 484. Although having procedural aspects similar 
to the parol evidence rule in that it operates to exclude evidence, the Statute of Frauds is 
also substantive in nature because it guides people in the formation of contracts and 
defines certain essential contractual elements. 
33. Burden of proof requirements, true evidentiary rules, may also be more substan- 
tive than procedural. These requirements provide a method of assuring the orderly presen- 
tation of evidence at trial. See Clapp, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 10 RUTGERS 
L. REV. 541, 572 & n.123 (1956); Green, supra note 28, at 484. In the sense that judicial 
action cannot be taken unless the proof rises to a certain level, however, a substantive 
right and duty are constituted by burden of proof rules. 
34. 3 J .  HONIGMAN & C. HAWKINS, supra note 32, at 403-04; Joiner & Miller, supra 
note 30, a t  651; Riedl, supra note 31, at 604. But see Clapp, supra note 33, at 569-71; 
Morgan, supra note 17, at 483-84; Stein, supra note 4, at 646. See generally Levin & 
Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-making: A Problem in Constitutional 
Revision, 107 U .  PA. L. REV. 1, 22-24 (1958). 
35. 3 J. HONIGMAN & C. HAWKINS, supra note 32, a t  403-04. 
36. Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 551 P.2d 1354, 1356 (N.M. 1976). 
37. Id. a t  1357. 
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real question about rules of privilege being rules of ev iden~e ."~~ 
While cautioning that the line between procedural and substan- 
tive matters was elusive, the court concluded that the rules of 
evidence are "very largely, if not entirely, procedural" because of 
their function in the judicial process.39 Pointing to the adoption 
of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence, the court declared that the 
Rules must be procedural because the court had power only to 
promulgate procedural rules.40 
Having decided that the privilege was procedural, the court 
turned to the question of which governmental branch had the 
authority to prescribe procedural rules. Reviewing the line of 
cases beginning with Roy, the court concluded that the exclusive 
power to prescribe procedural rules was vested in the judiciary. 
Observing that the New Mexico Rules of Evidence specifically 
exclude any privilege not expressly granted therein, the court 
held that the legislatively enacted newsman's privilege was in- 
valid in judicial proceedings4' because no legislative enactment 
could conflict with the judicially promulgated procedural rules.42 
A. Privileges-Su bstantive or Procedural? 
Essential to the court's conclusion in the instant case was the 
reasoning that all rules of evidence are procedural. Clearly, the 
court was correct in characterizing privileges, including the news- 
man's privilege, as rules of evidence." Less supportable, however, 
is the court's assertion that rules of evidence are procedural. 
In light of scholarly views noting the substantive nature of 
some rules of evidence, including privileges, it would have been 
proper for the court in the instant case to have entertained some 
doubt as to whether the newsman's privilege was a procedural 
rule. The court, however, never questioned its general determina- 
- -- 
38. Id. at 1356. 
39. Id. at 1357. Quoting from McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34,41(1924), the court 
stated that "rules of evidence do no more than regulate the method of proceeding by which 
substantive duties are determined." 
40. 551 P.2d at 1357. 
41. The question of the statute's validity with respect to legislative, executive, or 
administrative proceedings was not before the court. Id. at 1359. 
42. Id. at 1357-60. 
43. See 3 S. GARD, JONES ON EVIDENCE, CML AND CRIMINAL 4 21:1, at 744 (6th ed. 
1972); MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 4 72, a t  151 (2d ed. E. Cleary 
1972); 1 J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 264 (1898); 
8 J. WIGMORE, VIDENCE 4 2285, at 527 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961). 
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tion that the privilege, as a rule of evidence, must be procedural. 
Failing to discuss the possibility that substantive rights had been 
vested in newsmen by the statute, the court bluntly and summa- 
rily concluded that all privileges are procedural. 
The authorities cited by the court to support its reasoning are 
not conclusive. Only one, Judge Alfred C. Clapp writing in 1956, 
unconditionally takes the position that all privileges are proce- 
dural." In citing Professor Morgan for the proposition that privi- 
leges are within the court's rulemaking authority, the court failed 
to consider his caveat. According to Morgan, a court may not 
abrogate a legislatively enacted common law privilege even 
though it was originally created by court decision.45 
Moreover, the previous New Mexico case law does not sup- 
port the result reached by the court in the instant case. For exam- 
ple, in Kreigh v. State Bank,46 the court indicated that certain 
legislation modifying burden of proof requirements was valid. 
Although the court's reasoning in Kreigh is unclear, it is difficult 
to reconcile the case with the disparate result in the instant case. 
If the Kreigh court refused to disturb the legislatively enacted 
burden of proof, which it termed a rule of evidence,'' because it 
was a substantive matter, then the result in the instant case is 
disturbing. Because burden of proof requirements are more 
clearly associated with the orderly dispatch of justice, normally 
the touchstone in distinguishing between substance and proce- 
dure, than are  privilege^,^^ Kreigh would indicate that privileges 
are substantive matters within the legislature's power to adopt or 
modify. If, however, the Kreigh court decided that the burden of 
proof was a procedural matter, then the case must stand for the 
44. Clapp, supra note 33, at 570-71. Clapp pointed to Justice Brandeis' dicta in 
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 41 (1924), that the privilege against self- 
incrimination "relates to the adjective law." Thus, reasoned Clapp, "if this privilege 
against self-incrimination is procedural, then there can be no doubt as to other privileges, 
and indeed all rules of evidence, are also procedural." Clapp, supra note 33, at 570-71. 
Clapp's line of argument fails to note that the fifth amendment privilege is founded 
on different policies than are other privileges. The privilege against self-incrimination 
governs an individual's relationship with the courts, not with other individuals. A news- 
man's privilege, however, fosters a nonjudicial relationship-the uninhibited flow of infor- 
mation between a newsman and his sources. See Carter, The Journalist, His Informant 
and Testimonial Privilege, 35 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1111 (1960). 
45. Morgan states that the "so-called common law privileges of witnesses were cre- 
ated by judicial decision . . . and in the absence of statute, can be disregarded or abolished 
by judicial decision." Morgan, supra note 17, at 483 (emphasis added). 
46. 37 N.M. 360, 23 P.2d 1085 (1933). 
47. Id. at 367, 23 P.2d at 1089. 
48. See note 33 supra. 
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proposition that the New Mexico legislature has concurrent au- 
thority with the court even as to procedural matters.49 Thus, if the 
legislature could properly modify a burden of proof requirement, 
it could also add to the privileges granted to witnesses. 
A later New Mexico case cited by the court, State u. Arnold,5n 
also does not support the result reached in the instant case. 
Arnold was cited for the proposition that legislatively enacted 
procedural rules that conflict with judicially promulgated rules 
must yield to the latter. In Arnold, the court was faced with a 
statute that directly conflicted with a court rule limiting the ap- 
peal time in civil actions.51 The instant case, however, did not 
involve inconsistent procedural rules. The only possible conflict 
of the newsman's privilege is with Rule 501 of the New Mexico 
evidentiary rules, which provides that no privileges are to be rec- 
ognized except as required by the constitution, the other rules of 
evidence, or rules adopted by the supreme court.52 Because it 
conflicts with no other privilege in the Rules, the newsman's priv- 
ilege conflicts with Rule 501 only by negative implication, if at 
all." Because a legislative enactment of a substantive nature does 
not upset other positive rules established by the court, there may 
in fact be no conflict with Rule 501. 
Finally, by referring to the adoption of the New Mexico Rules 
of Evidence for support of the conclusion that the newsman's 
privilege was procedural and therefore within its exclusive power, 
the court resorted to circular reasoning based upon labelling. 
Since it had properly promulgated the Rules, the court argued, 
then those Rules, including privileges, must be procedural. Thus, 
the court declared, the newsman's privilege was a procedural rule 
within the court's sole adoptive power. Again the court's reason- 
ing is clearly faulty, for, as noted above, not all rules of evidence 
are procedural. 
If the controverted newsman's privilege is substantive rather 
than procedural, the New Mexico Supreme Court should have 
49. This would directly contradict the holding in Anaya v. McBride, 88 N.M. 244, 
539 P.2d 1006 (1975). 
50. 51 N.M. 311, 183 P.2d 845 (1947). 
51. Id. at 314-15, 183 P.2d at 846-47. 
52. N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 20-4-501 (Supp. 1975): "Except as otherwise required by 
constitution, and except as provided in these rules or in other rules adopted by the 
Supreme Court, no person has a privilege to: (1) Refuse to be a witness; or (2) Refuse to 
disclose any matter; or (3) Refuse to produce any object or writing . . . ." 
53. The conflict exists, the court apparently believed, because the Rules are compre- 
hensive. See 551 P.2d at 1359. 
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recognized that the legislative enactment was constitutionally 
authorized. The court instead used a mechanical approach to 
label all privileges as rules of evidence and to define all rules of 
evidence as being procedural. The court simply used the terms 
"procedural" and "substantive" to give a result, not a reason. 
B. Rulemaking and the Balance of Legislative and Judicial 
Power 
1. Rules in the "twilight zone" between substance and 
procedure 
The court in the instant case recognized that the line be- 
tween substance and procedure is an elusive one?' The court, 
however, failed to discuss the question of which governmental 
branch-the legislature or the judiciary-should appropriately 
make the determination. 
The New Mexico Supreme Court had earlier addressed the 
question. In Southwest Underwriters v. M ~ n t o y a , ~ ~  Chief Justice 
Noble, writing for the court, stated: 
The distinction between substantive law and those rules of 
pleading, practice and procedure which are essential to the per- 
formance of the constitutional duties imposed upon the courts 
is not always clearly defined. There may be areas in which pro- 
cedural matters so closely border upon substantive rights and 
remedies that legislative enactments with respect thereto would 
be proper.56 
If not clearly substantive rules, privileges certainly qualify as 
rules that border closely upon substantive rights. Indeed, because 
it establishes and attempts to foster a nonjudicial relationship of 
confidentiality between a newsman and his sources, the news- 
man's privilege in question borders closely upon substantive 
rights. Thus, under Noble's formulation, the privilege would be 
proper for legislative enactment. 
Charles Anthony Riedl has also explained the reason for 
empowering the legislature to deal with substance-procedure de- 
terminations: 
As to those rules which may fall in the "twilight zone," the 
doubt is to be resolved in favor of the legislature, because all 
- -- - 
54. Id. at 1357. 
55. 80 N.M. 107, 452 P.2d 176 (1969). 
56. Id. at 109, 452 P.2d at 178 (dicta). 
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power not essential to the independent exercise of its constitu- 
tional function by one of the three departments of government 
is vested in the legislature by virtue of it being the law making 
department .57 
Application of Riedl's formulation yields the same result as 
does application of Noble's language-the conclusion that the 
newsman's privilege was appropriate for legislative enactment. 
Because it can hardly be asserted that the exclusive power to 
enact a newsman's privilege is necessary for the court in order to 
exercise its constitutional supervisory power over lower courts, 
the legislature could properly enact the questioned privilege, 
since, under Riedl's test, it fell within the "twilight zone." Thus, 
under either formulation, the legislature could enact the privilege 
in question because it clearly borders on substantive rights and 
does not involve matters necessary for the fulfillment of the 
court's constitutional functions.58 
2. Public policy decisions as the legislative domain 
As a test for determining whether an evidentiary rule should 
be created by the court or by the legislature, one commentator 
has suggested the following: 
The test we propose is whether a given rule of evidence is a 
device with which to promote the adequate, simple, prompt and 
inexpensive administration of justice in the conduct of a trial or 
whether the rule, having nothing to do with procedure, is 
grounded upon a declaration of a general public policy. 
. . . If the rule is an expression of general public policy, then 
it can be prescribed only by the legislature. 59 
A reading of the New Mexico statute reveals that the legisla- 
ture made a policy decision in favor of the newsman-informant 
relationship and the uninhibited gathering of news. The statute 
calls for a policy of nondisclosure on the part of the newsmen as 
57. Riedl, supra note 31, at 604 (emphasis added). See also Curd, supra note 4, at 
48-49; Note, The Rule Making Power of the Florida Supreme Court: The Twilight Zone 
Between Substance and Procedure, 24 U .  FLA. L. REV. 87 (1971). 
58. The newsman's privilege was not intended to aid in what Pound termed "the 
orderly dispatch of judicial business, the saving of public time, and maintenance of the 
dignity of tribunals." See Wells, Criminal Sanctions Imposed Against Newsmen: Shield 
Protection Needed, 2 AM. J .  CRIM. L. 309, 323 (1974); Note, Newsman-Source Privilege: 
A Foundation in Policy for Recognition at Common Law, 26 U .  kA. L. REV. 453,464,469- 
70 (1974). See generally Comment, Journalists in the Courts: Toward Effective Shield 
Legislation, 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 664 (1974). 
59. Riedl, supra note 31, at 604 (emphasis added). 
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to their sources and their unpublished information collected in 
the newsgathering process.60 Furthermore, an earlier version of 
the statute itself indicated that it represented a policy decision 
by the legi~lature.~~ 
Even one of the authorities cited by the court recognized that 
the privilege represents a policy decision.62 P.B. Carter, in arguing 
against the newsman's privilege, states that any justification for 
the privilege must be found in policy. Carter characterizes the 
usual policies supporting the privilege as encouragement of the 
free flow of news'and respect for the "conscience" of the 
journalist-confidant. Indeed, Carter points out that the privilege 
inhibits the administration of court business because it blocks the 
search for Surely the decision to favor nondisclosure a t  
the expense of finding truth involves a public policy decision. If, 
as Carter suggests, the privilege inhibits the search for truth, then 
it cannot be a rule to promote the "adequate . . . and inexpensive 
administration of j~stice."'~ Thus, the privilege is clearly a stat- 
ute declaring public policy and not one aimed at the orderly 
dispatch of judicial business. 
New Mexico statutes creating privileged communications 
have existed since 1880. The right of the state legislature to enact 
witnesses' privileges has gone unchallenged until the instant 
case.65 In fact, no other case has been discovered where a court 
has invalidated a legislatively created newsman's privilege? 
Apparently, the New Mexico Supreme Court is alone in asserting 
that the power to create such a privilege is exclusively vested in 
the judiciary. In view of the fact that a t  least twenty-four other 
states have newsman's privilege statutes,67 the court's position in 
the instant case is suspect. Because the creation of the privilege 
involved a determination of public policy, the legislative enact- 
60. There is, however, a stipulation that disclosure may be required if it is essential 
to prevent injustice. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1(A) (Supp. 1975). 
61. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1(A) (1953) (repealed 1973): 
It is hereby declared to be the public policy of New Mexico that no reporter 
shall be required to disclose before any proceeding or by any authority the source 
of information procured by him in the course of his employment as a reporter 
for a news media unless disclosure be essential to prevent injustice. 
62. Carter, supra note 44, at 1121-22. 
63. Id. 
64. Riedl, supra note 31, at 604; Joiner & Miller, supra note 30, at 635. 
65. Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 7, Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc., 
551 P.2d 1354 (N.M. 1976). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 9, 17-19. See Wells, supra note 58, at 323-28. 
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ment should have been upheld." In invalidating the statute, the 
court violated a long-standing maxim that the judiciary should 
not strike down a statute unless the court was completely satis- 
fied that the legislature had acted beyond its constitutional lim- 
i t ~ . ~ ~  
IV. CONCLUSION 
In reaching the conclusion that the legislatively enacted 
newsman's privilege was an unconstitutional infringement on its 
power to promulgate procedural rules, the New Mexico Supreme 
Court used a mechanical lockstep approach. While correctly cate- 
gorizing the privilege as an evidentiary rule, the court incorrectly 
decided that all rules of evidence are procedural and thus within 
the court's exclusive power to promulgate. In so doing, the court 
failed to consider substantive aspects of the privilege that made 
it appropriate for legislative enactment. 
68. Typical of the language of courts which have dealt with the issue is this from an 
Alabama federal district court: 
It is not a matter of judicial concern that the Legislature of Alabama was 
either prudent or unwise in clothing the sources of a journalist's information 
with secrecy. So far as this is concerned, the public policy of the State of 
Alabama in this regard was crystallized by enactment of the statute involved. 
Ex parte Sparrow, 14 F.R.D. 351, 353 (N.D. Ala. 1953). 
69. Hovey Concrete Prod. Co. v. Mechem, 63 N.M. 250, 251-52, 316 P.2d 1069, 1070 
(1957). 
